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Abstract—This paper considers a distributed Nash equilibrium
seeking problem, where the players only have partial access to
other players’ actions, such as their neighbors’ actions. Thus,
the players are supposed to communicate with each other to
estimate other players’ actions. To solve the problem, a leader-
following consensus gradient-free distributed Nash equilibrium
seeking algorithm is proposed. This algorithm utilizes only the
measurements of the player’s local cost function without the
knowledge of its explicit expression or the requirement on its
smoothness. Hence, the algorithm is gradient-free during the en-
tire updating process. Moreover, the analysis on the convergence
of the Nash equilibrium is studied for the algorithm with both
diminishing and constant step-sizes, respectively. Specifically, in
the case of diminishing step-size, it is shown that the players’
actions converge to the Nash equilibrium almost surely, while in
the case of fixed step-size, the convergence to the neighborhood
of the Nash equilibrium is achieved. The performance of the
proposed algorithm is verified through numerical simulations.
Index Terms—Nash equilibrium seeking, non-cooperative
games, game theory, gradient-free methods, distributed algo-
rithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the decades, game theory, as a power tool of analyzing
the strategic interactions between rational decision-makers, has
found its great potential in various application fields such as
social science, economics, electricity markets, power systems,
to list a few. An important concept in game theory, Nash
equilbrium, named after John Forbes Nash Jr., is a proposed
solution in non-cooperative games involving two or more play-
ers. Recently, with the emergence of multi-agent system, Nash
equilibrium seeking in multi-player non-cooperative games
has received increasing attention. More precisely, this type of
games involves a number of players, who selfishly minimize
their own cost functions by making decisions in response to
other players’ actions.
Recently, a large number of studies on Nash equilibrium
computation in non-cooperative games have been reported,
such as [1]–[6] to list a few. The challenge of such problem
settings is the requirement of global knowledge on all players’
actions, which is not practical if the underlying communication
network is not fully connected. In such cases, players have to
make decisions based only on a limited set of information,
such as the information from the neighbors. Therefore, a
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distributed information sharing protocol is usually adopted
to disseminate the local information among players. For ex-
ample, a dynamic average consensus protocol was adopted
in [7], where a primal-dual dynamic based seeking strategy
was developed to find Nash equilibrium in set constrained
aggregate games. It was also utilized in [8] with the help
of differential inclusions and differentiated projections for
aggregative games, where the players’ actions are coupled by
linear constraints. The dynamic average consensus protocol
was also proposed to achieve simultaneous social cost mini-
mization and Nash equilibrium in a class of N -coalition games
in [9]. Different from these works, the work in [10] consid-
ered a continuous time generalized convex game with shared
inequality constraints among players, and proposed a leader-
following consensus protocol with gradient descent method to
compute the generalized Nash equilibrium. This protocol was
also employed in [11] to estimate the other players’ actions
for the generalized games, where the players’ action sets are
constrained by nonlinear inequality and linear equations. Apart
from the leader-following consensus and dynamic average
consensus protocols, gossip-based averaging techniques were
also commonly utilized in Nash equilibrium computations,
such as [12], [13]. Most of the existing literature including
the aforementioned works are model-based approaches, i.e.,
the implementation of the algorithms relies on the knowledge
of the explicit form of the players’ cost functions, such as
the derivative computation. However, the requirement of the
knowledge on the explicit expression of players’ cost functions
is restrictive in the cases where the input/output relationship
is difficult to model.
There are non-model based approaches, which utilize the
players’ local measurements without the requirement on the
information of the functional form. For example, the work in
[14] considered a generalized convex game with both convex
coupling inequality constraints and local set constraints. A
finite-differencing method with two-way perturbations was
proposed to approximate the partial gradient. The perturbation
parameter needs to be chosen carefully to match the selected
step-size. Different from that, the work in [15] proposed a
distributed payoff-based algorithm for a class of convex games
with and without coupling constraints. This technique was
further extended in [16] where the algorithm convergence
was proved under mere monotonicity assumption. Overall,
the payoff-based learning strategy proposed in these two
works enables players to sample their actions in a Gaussian
distribution. Then, the mean of this distribution is iteratively
updated using only local payoff values. Another typical non-
model based approaches are extremum seeking-based meth-
ods, such as [17]–[22]. Specifically, the work in [17] proposed
a continuous time multi-input stochastic extremum seeking
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algorithm for the Nash equilibrium seeking in non-cooperative
games with general nonlinear cost functions. In [18], a discrete
time stochastic extremum seeking method was presented in
non-cooperative games where the players’ cost functions are
strictly convex, but the actions are subject to a linear dynamic
constraint. The work in [19] developed an integrator-type
extremum seeking algorithm in non-cooperative games with
both quadratic payoffs and general non-quadratic payoffs as
the output of a dynamic system. More extremum seeking
algorithms have been proposed in potential games with un-
stable dynamics [20], dynamical constraints [21], and non-
cooperative games with time-varying Nash equilibrium [23].
In general, the extremum seeking strategy makes use of the
cost value together with some sinusoidal dither signals for
perturbation, such that the gradient of the cost function is
extractable. Even though all the aforementioned works need
no explicit model information during the implementation, they
assume the players’ cost functions to be smooth to some
extent, which can be restrictive if the players’ cost functions
are generally non-differentiable. This motivates the study of
gradient-free technique, which is free of the knowledge on
the explicit expressions of the players’ cost functions and
applicable to non-differentiable problems. In fact, gradient-
free algorithms have been studied in distributed optimization
problems [24]–[29]. However, little attention has been received
in non-cooperative games.
In this paper, we focus on the research of non-model based
Nash equilibrium seeking methods. Specifically, a gradient-
free distributed algorithm is proposed to solve the Nash
equilibrium seeking problem in a multi-player non-cooperative
static game under a directed communication graph. As com-
pared to the existing literature, the major contributions of this
paper are twofold.
1) The proposed algorithm does not rely on the knowledge
of the explicit form of the players’ cost functions. Dif-
ferent from non-model based approaches such as payoff-
based learning [15], [16] and extremum seeking [17]–
[22], the proposed algorithm allows the cost functions to
be non-smooth. Unlike the finite-differencing method in
[14] where the perturbation parameter needs to match
the step-size, the proposed algorithm establishes the
convergence to the Nash equilibrium with only the
requirement of a small smoothing parameter.
2) The convergence of the proposed algorithm to the Nash
equilibrium is rigorously studied for both diminishing
and constant step-sizes, respectively. Specifically, for
the diminishing case, an exact convergence to the Nash
equilibrium is attained, while for the constant case, an
approximate convergence to the Nash equilibrium with
the gap proportional to the step-size is achieved.
The paper is organized as follows. The problem is defined
in section II. Main procedures of the proposed algorithm
are described in section III. The convergence analysis of
the proposed algorithm for both diminishing step-size and
constant step-size is presented in section IV. In section V, the
performance of the proposed algorithm is illustrated through
a numerical example. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
This section firstly introduces the notations used. Then, the
problem is formulated, followed by some preliminary results.
A. Notations
We use R and RN to denote the set of real numbers and N -
dimensional column vectors, respectively. For a matrix A, the
element in the i-th row and j-th column of A is represented
by [A]ij , and its transpose is denoted by A>. We write E[·] to
denote the expected value of a random variable. For any two
vectors x and y, the operator 〈x,y〉 denotes the inner product
of x and y. We use ‖x‖ for the standard Euclidean norm of
a vector x, i.e., ‖x‖ = √〈x,x〉, and PΩ[x] for the projection
of a vector x on the set Ω, i.e., PΩ[x] = arg minxˆ∈Ω ‖xˆ −
x‖2. For a differentiable function f , we use ∇xf(x, y) to
represent its partial derivative with respect to x at the point
(x, y). For a possibly non-differentiable function f , we denote
its ε-subdifferential by ∂εxf(x, y) at x for any fixed y, i.e.,
f(z, y) ≥ f(x, y) − ε + 〈g, z − x〉, g ∈ ∂εxf(x, y). If ε = 0,
we simplify the notation to ∂xf(x, y), which is the set of its
subgradients at x for any fixed y. For a sequence of random
vectors ak, we say that ak converges to a almost surely, if the
probability of limk→∞ ak = a is 1.
B. Problem Definition
We consider a directed communication graph represented
by G = {V, E}, where V is the set of agents, and E ⊂ V × V
is the set of edges, i.e., for any i, j ∈ V , the ordered pair
(i, j) ∈ E if and only if the information can be transfered
from agent i to agent j. In particular, the set E includes (i, i)
for all i ∈ V . A matrix A associated with the directed graph G
is known as the adjacency matrix, which is designed such that
[A]ij > 0 if (j, i) ∈ E and [A]ij = 0 otherwise. The set of in-
neighbors (respectively, out-neighbors) of agent i is denoted
by N ini = {j ∈ V|(j, i) ∈ E} (respectively, N outi = {j ∈
V|(i, j) ∈ E}). In particular, agent i is both an in-neighbor
and an out-neighbor of itself, i.e., i ∈ N ini and i ∈ N outi . It
should be noted that N ini 6= N outi in general.
Consider a game Γ with N players that communicate with
each other under a directed communication graph G = {V, E}.
The set of players is V = {1, 2, . . . , N}. Each player i ∈ V
owns a cost function fi : Ω→ R, where Ω = Ωi×Ω−i ⊂ RN
is the action set of all players, and Ωi ⊂ R (respectively,
Ω−i ⊂ RN−1) denotes the action set of player i (respectively,
all players except player i). Let x = (xi,x−i) ∈ Ω be the
vector of all players’ actions, where xi ∈ Ωi (respectively,
x−i ∈ Ω−i) represents the action of player i (respectively, all
players except player i). Under the communication graph G, if
player j is not an out-neighbor of player i (i.e., j /∈ N outi ), then
player j does not have direct access to player i’s action. Game
Γ(N, {fi}, {Ωi},G) is played such that for given x−i ∈ Ω−i,
the objective of each player i ∈ V is to minimize its own cost
function, i.e.,
min
xi∈Ωi
fi(xi,x−i), i ∈ V. (1)
It should be emphasized that the explicit mathematical expres-
sion of the cost function fi is unknown, but each player i ∈ V
can measure the value of fi by introducing some input to the
system fi. Moreover, the solution set of player i ∈ V to the
problem (1) is dependent on the other players’ action x−i,
which may not be directly accessible. Thus, the objective is to
develop a distributed strategy such that all players’ actions
converge to a Nash equilibrium under the communication
graph G.
The formal definition of a Nash equilibrium of a game Γ is
given below [30].
Definition 1: Consider a game Γ(N, {fi}, {Ωi},G). Nash
equilibrium is an action profile where no player can reduce
its cost by unilaterally changing its own action, i.e., a vector
x? = (x?i ,x
?
−i) ∈ Ω is called a Nash equilibrium of the game
Γ(N, {fi}, {Ωi},G) if and only if
fi(x
?
i ,x
?
−i) ≤ fi(xi,x?−i), ∀xi ∈ Ωi,∀i ∈ V.
The following standard assumptions are made throughout
the paper.
Assumption 1: The directed graph G is strongly connected
and its associated adjacency matrix A is doubly-stochastic,
i.e.,
∑N
j=1[A]ij = 1 for all i ∈ V , and
∑N
i=1[A]ij = 1 for all
j ∈ V .
Assumption 2: For each player i ∈ V , its action set Ωi is
non-empty, convex and compact. The cost function fi(xi,x−i)
is convex in xi for every x−i, and jointly continuous in x but
not necessarily differentiable. Also, fi(xi,x−i) is Lipschitz
continuous in xi (respectively, x−i) for every fixed x−i
(respectively, xi), i.e., ∀xi, yi ∈ Ωi (respectively, ∀x−i,y−i ∈
Ω−i), there exists a positive constant D1 (respectively, D2)
such that ‖fi(xi,x−i)− fi(yi,x−i)‖ ≤ D1‖xi − yi‖ (respec-
tively, ‖fi(xi,x−i)− fi(xi,y−i)‖ ≤ D2‖x−i − y−i‖).
Remark 1: Both Assumptions 1 and 2 are standard and
commonly assumed in distributed Nash equilibrium seeking
problems. In particular, Assumption 2 implies that game
Γ(N, {fi}, {Ωi},G) admits a Nash equilibrium [31]–[33,
Prop.2.2].
C. Preliminaries
Since the cost function fi(xi,x−i) may not be partially
differentiable in xi as in Assumption 2, we introduce a
Gaussian-smoothed version of the cost function fi(xi,x−i)
given by [34]
fi,µi(xi,x−i) =
1
κ
∫
R
fi(xi + µ
iξi,x−i)e−
1
2‖ξi‖2dξi,
where ξi ∈ R is a normally distributed random variable,
κ =
∫
R e
− 12‖ξi‖2dξi = (2pi)1/2, and µi ≥ 0 is a smoothing
parameter of function fi,µi(xi,x−i). Then, the randomized
gradient-free oracle of fi(xi,x−i) can be designed as [34]
giµi(xi,x−i) =
fi(xi + µ
iξi,x−i)− fi(xi,x−i)
µi
ξi.
From the results in [27]–[29], [34], it can be easily shown
that the functions giµi(xi,x−i) and fi,µi(xi,x−i) satisfy some
properties which are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Suppose Assumption 2 holds. The functions
giµi(xi,x−i) and fi,µi(xi,x−i), ∀i ∈ V satisfy the following
properties:
1) The function fi,µi(xi,x−i) is convex in xi due to the
convexity of fi in xi. Moreover, fi,µi(xi,x−i) satisfies
fi(xi,x−i) ≤ fi,µi(xi,x−i) ≤ fi(xi,x−i) + µiD1.
2) The function fi,µi(xi,x−i) is partially differentiable in
xi and its partial derivative with respect to xi satisfies
∇xifi,µi(xi,x−i) = E[giµi(xi,x−i)],
and is Lipschitz continuous in xi with a constant L1 =
maxi∈V D1µi , and Lipschitz continuous in x−i with a
constant L2 = maxi∈V D2µi , i.e.,
‖∇xifi,µi(xi,x−i)−∇xifi,µi(yi,x−i)‖ ≤ L1‖xi − yi‖,
‖∇xifi,µi(xi,x−i)−∇xifi,µi(xi,y−i)‖
≤ L2‖x−i − y−i‖.
Further, ∇xifi,µi(xi,x−i) always belongs to some ε-
subdifferential of function fi(xi,x−i), i.e.,
∇xifi,µi(xi,x−i) ∈ ∂εxifi(xi,x−i), ε = µiD1.
Specifically, we have∇xifi,0(xi,x−i) ∈ ∂xifi(xi,x−i),
when µi tends to 01.
3) The random gradient-free oracle giµi(xi,x−i) satisfies
E[‖giµi(xi,x−i)‖] ≤
√
E[‖giµi(xi,x−i)‖2] ≤ B,
where B = √n+ 4D1, n is the dimension of xi.
We formulate a smoothed version of game Γ with
the Gaussian-smoothed cost function fi,µi , denoted by
Γµ(N, {fi,µi}, {Ωi},G). Under Assumption 2, the hold of
Lemma 1 implies that the smoothed cost functions fi,µi have
similar properties to fi stated in Assumption 2. Hence, game
Γµ(N, {fi,µi}, {Ωi},G) admits a Nash equilibrium for the
same reasoning as in Remark 1. The following result shows
the equivalence of games Γ and Γµ under certain conditions.
Lemma 2: Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Games Γ and Γµ
are equivalent and share the same Nash equilibria when the
smoothing parameter µi,∀i ∈ V tends to 0.
Proof: From Remark 1 and previous discussion, Assumption 2
implies the existence of Nash equilibrium in both games Γ and
Γµ. Moreover, applying Squeeze Theorem to Lemma 1-1), we
have
lim
µi→0
fi,µi(xi,x−i) = fi(xi,x−i), ∀i ∈ V.
Then, games Γ and Γµ share the same number of players,
cost functions, action sets and communication graph. Hence
the result holds. 
Next, we make some definitions on the game mappings of
games Γ(N, {fi}, {Ωi},G) and Γµ(N, {fi,µi}, {Ωi},G). For
game Γ, since the cost function fi in game Γ is not necessarily
differentiable, so the game mapping of game Γ refers to a
1In this paper, we slightly abuse the notation µi to represent the sequence
µik just for easy presentation without the loss of generality. We mean µ
i
tending to 0 by limk→∞ µik = 0.
set-valued map F(x), which is defined as the map of the
subdifferentials of all players’ cost functions:
F(x) =
∏
i∈V
∂xifi(xi,x−i).
If the cost function fi is differentiable, then the game mapping
F(x) reduces to a single-valued map. For game Γµ, since the
cost function fi,µi is differentiable, so the game mapping of
game Γµ refers to a single-valued map Fµ, which is defined by
stacking the partial derivatives of all smoothed cost functions:
Fµ(x) = [∇x1f1,µ1(x1,x−1), . . . ,∇xN fN,µN (xN ,x−N )]>.
When µi tends to 0 for all i ∈ V , we denote the game mapping
Fµ by F0(x), i.e.,
F0(x) = lim
µi→0,∀i∈V
Fµ(x) = [. . . ,∇xifi,0(xi,x−i), . . .]>.
Thus, based on Lemma 1-2), we have F0(x) ∈ F(x).
III. GRADIENT-FREE DISTRIBUTED NE SEEKING
In this section, we describe our proposed distributed Nash
equilibrium (NE) seeking algorithm in details.
At time k, each player i ∈ V maintains an estimate of all
players’ actions, denoted by yik = [y
i
1,k, . . . , y
i
N,k]
> ∈ RN ,
where yij,k, j ∈ V represents player i’s estimate of player j’s
action. Hence, at time k, every player l ∈ V passes its estimate
of all players’ actions ylj,k, j ∈ V and its own action xl,k to its
out-neighbors. Then, for each player i ∈ V , on receiving the
information from its in-neighbors, it updates its own action
and the estimate of all players’ actions (including the estimate
of its own local action) based on the following updating laws:
xi,k+1 = PΩi [xi,k − αkgiµi(yik)], (2a)
yij,k+1 =
N∑
l=1
[A]ily
l
j,k + δi[A]ij(xj,k − yij,k), j ∈ V (2b)
where giµi(y
i
k) is the randomized gradient-free oracle
giµi(y
i
k) =
fi(y
i
i,k + µ
iξik,y
i
−i,k)− fi(yii,k,yi−i,k)
µi
ξik, (3)
The parameter δi > 0 is a constant, and αk ≥ 0 is a step-
size sequence. The initial values xi,0 and yij,0 for i, j ∈ V
can be any real numbers. The adjacency matrix A is doubly-
stochastic as supposed in Assumption 1. It should be noted
that the design of a doubly-stochastic adjacency matrix A for a
given directed graph is non-trivial. The detailed procedures can
be referred to the work in [35], where two distributed strategies
(imbalance-correcting algorithm and load-pushing algorithm)
have been developed to construct such matrix under different
conditions. With the well-constructed matrix A, each player i
selects the parameter δi such that 0 ≤ δi[A]ij < 2[A]ii for all
j ∈ V . The above mentioned procedures are summarized in
Algorithm 1.
Remark 2: In (2b), it should be noted that [A]ij = 0 if player
j is NOT an in-neighbor of player i, which implies that player
i updates the estimate of player j’s action only based on the
estimates ylj,k from its in-neighbors l ∈ N ini . On the other
Algorithm 1 Gradient-free distributed NE seeking
1: Initialize: i ∈ V
arbitrarily generate xi,0, yij,0, j ∈ V in R
randomly generate {ξik}k≥0 ∼ N (0, 1)
set δi such that 0 ≤ δi[A]ij < 2[A]ii, ∀j ∈ V
2: Iteration (k ≥ 0): i ∈ V
compute giµi(y
i
k) based on (3)
update variables xi,k+1 based on (2a)
update variables yij,k+1 based on (2b)
3: Output: i ∈ V
xi,k → x?
hand, if player j is an in-neighbor of player i, then [A]ij 6= 0
giving rise to an additional error term δi[A]ij(xj,k − yij,k) in
the update of the estimate on player j’s action.
IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we study the convergence of the algorithm
to the Nash equilibrium for the scenarios of diminishing step-
size and constant step-size, respectively. We let Fk denote the
σ-field generated by the entire history of the random variables
from step 0 to k − 1, i.e.,
Fk =
{
{xi,0, yij,0, i, j ∈ V}, k = 0,
{xi,0, yij,0, ξis, i, j ∈ V; 0 ≤ s ≤ k − 1}, k ≥ 1.
Next, we introduce an important property related to the adja-
cency matrix A summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 3: Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Let δl > 0, l ∈ V
be selected such that 0 ≤ δl[A]li < 2[A]ll for all i ∈ V , where
A is the adjacency matrix. Then, there exists a constant C > 0
and γ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for k ≥ 1, the matrix A˜i given by
[A˜i]lm =
{
[A]lm if l 6= m
|[A]ll − δl[A]li| if l = m
holds that ‖A˜ki ‖∞ < Cγk.
Proof: We first show that all the row sums of A˜i are always
less than or equal to 1. For any l ∈ N , if 0 ≤ δl[A]li ≤ [A]ll,
since A is doubly-stochastic, we have
∑N
n=1[A˜i]ln = 1 −
δl[A]li ≤ 1; if [A]ll < δl[A]li < 2[A]ll, similarly, we have∑N
n=1[A˜i]ln = 1 + δl[A]li − 2[A]ll < 1. Hence, we always
have
∑N
n=1[A˜i]ln ≤ 1 for any l ∈ N where the equal sign
holds only if [A]li = 0.
Next, we show that all the eigenvalues of A˜i have magnitude
less than or equal to 1. Let λ be an eigenvalue of the matrix
A˜i, and let v = [v1, . . . , vN ]> be a corresponding eigenvector.
Then we have λv = A˜iv, i.e., for each row j ∈ V
λvj = [A˜i]j1v1 + [A˜i]j2v2 + · · ·+ [A˜i]jNvN .
Suppose the k-th entry of v has the maximal absolute value
(denoted by |vˆ|) among all |vj |, j ∈ V . Then, letting j = k in
the above equation, and noting that all the entries of A˜i are
non-negative and the row sums are less than or equal to 1, we
have
|λ||vˆ| = |λ||vk| =
∣∣∣∣ N∑
n=1
[A˜i]knvn
∣∣∣∣
≤
( N∑
n=1
[A˜i]kn
)
|vˆ| ≤ |vˆ|, (4)
which leads to |λ| ≤ 1 as |vˆ| > 0.
Next, we show |λ| 6= 1 by contradiction. Suppose |λ| = 1,
then the relation (4) is true if the equal signs in both inequal-
ities are satisfied, which implies the following properties:
1) (first equal sign) if [A˜i]kn 6= 0, then |vn| = |vˆ|;
2) (second equal sign) [A]ki = 0.
If player k has an in-neighbour, say player n 6= k, then
[A˜i]kn = [A]kn 6= 0. From property 1), we have |vn| = |vˆ|.
Thus, the n-th entry of v also has the maximal absolute value.
That means if player n ∈ V is a direct in-neighbor of the
player k ∈ V with |vk| = |vˆ|, then |vn| = |vˆ|. Since the graph
is strongly connected, thus we can always find a path for each
player n ∈ V linking to player k, i.e., n → · · · → k. Thus,
from the above analysis, we have |vn| = · · · = |vk| = |vˆ|
along this path. Therefore, we have |vn| = |vˆ| for all n ∈ V .
From property 2), |vn| = |vˆ| for all n ∈ V implies that
[A]ni = 0 for all n ∈ V , which is impossible due to the strong
connectivity of the graph. Therefore, the eigenvalues of A˜i can
only have magnitude strictly less than 1, i.e., |λ| < 1.
Finally, we represent A˜ki in the Jordan canonical form for
some Pm, Jm and Qm. Since all the eigenvalues of A˜i have
magnitude smaller than 1, then the diagonal entries in Jm are
smaller than 1, for all m. Thus, there exists a constant C > 0
and γ ∈ (0, 1) such that
‖A˜ki ‖ =
∥∥∥∥ N∑
m=1
PmJ
k
mQm
∥∥∥∥ ≤ N∑
m=1
‖Pm‖‖Qm‖‖Jkm‖ ≤ Cγk,
which completes the proof. 
Remark 3: Similar to the result in [36, Corollary 1], con-
stants C and γ in Lemma 3 depend on the minimum weight
(denoted by φ) that each player gives to its own value and the
values of its neighbors (i.e., if [A]ij > 0, then [A]ij ≥ φ), the
number of players N , and the parameters {δl}l∈V selected by
all players. Moreover, for larger N and smaller φ, constant
γ gets closer to 1, implying a slower convergence rate; for
δl → 0 or δl[A]li → 2[A]ll, ∀l ∈ V , matrix A˜i reduces to A
and constant γ gets closer to 1, implying a slower convergence
rate.
A. Diminishing Step-Size
In this part, we adopt the diminishing step-size sequence in
the proposed algorithm, i.e., the step-size sequence αk satisfies
that
∑∞
k=0 αk =∞ and
∑∞
k=0 α
2
k <∞.
Now, we present the result on the consensus property: for
any i ∈ V , each player l’s estimate of player i’s action yli,k, l ∈
V converges to player i’s real action xi,k as k goes to infinity,
which is formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let
{xi,k}k≥0, {yli,k}k≥0, i, l ∈ V be the sequences generated by
(2a) and (2b), respectively, with a step-size sequence {αk}k≥0
satisfying
∑∞
k=0 αk =∞ and
∑∞
k=0 α
2
k <∞, and a positive
constant δl, l ∈ V satisfying 0 ≤ δl[A]li < 2[A]ll for all i ∈ V ,
where A is the adjacency matrix. Then, we have
lim
k→∞
E[‖xi,k − yli,k‖] = 0, i, l ∈ V.
Proof: It can be obtained from (2a) and (2b) that
xi,k+1 = PΩi [xi,k − αkgiµi(yik)],
yli,k+1 =
N∑
m=1
[A]lmy
m
i,k + δl[A]li(xi,k − yli,k).
Then, taking the subtraction and applying the norm
‖xi,k+1 − yli,k+1‖
≤
∥∥∥∥ N∑
m=1
[A]lm(xi,k − ymi,k)− δl[A]li(xi,k − yli,k)
∥∥∥∥
+ αk‖giµi(yik)‖
=
∥∥∥∥ N∑
m=1
[A˜i]lm(xi,k − ymi,k)
∥∥∥∥+ αk‖giµi(yik)‖
≤
N∑
m=1
[A˜i]lm‖xi,k − ymi,k‖+ αk‖giµi(yik)‖,
where the first inequality follows from the projection’s non-
expansive property, and the equality holds by the defintion of
A˜i as in Lemma 3. Hence, we obtain that
‖xi,k − yli,k‖ ≤
N∑
m=1
[A˜ki ]lm‖xi,0 − ymi,0‖
+
k−1∑
r=1
N∑
m=1
[A˜k−ri ]lmαr−1‖giµi(yir−1)‖
+ αk−1‖giµi(yik−1)‖.
Then, taking the total expectation, it follows from Lemmas 1-
3) and 3 that
E[‖xi,k − yli,k‖] ≤ NCσˆγk
+NCB
k−1∑
r=1
γk−rαr−1 + Bαk−1, (5)
where σˆ = maxi∈V σi and σi = maxm∈V |xi,0− ymi,0|. Taking
the limit k →∞ and noting that limk→∞ αk = 0, the desired
result follows from [27, Lemma 4-1)]. 
Remark 4: Theorem 1 is a characterization of the consensus
property of the algorithm. For any i ∈ V , each player l’s
estimate of player i’s action yli,k, l ∈ V converges to player i’s
real action xi,k as k goes to infinity.
Now, we make a mild assumption on the uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium in game Γ as follows.
Assumption 3: The game mapping F of game Γ is strictly
monotone on Ω, i.e., for any x,y ∈ Ω, x 6= y, f(x), f(y) ∈ F,
we have 〈f(x)− f(y),x− y〉 > 0.
Remark 5: Assumption 3 ensures the uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium in game Γ.
Now, we are ready to establish the convergence of all
players’ actions to the unique Nash equilibrium of game Γ,
which is formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Suppose Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Let
x? = (x?i ,x
?
−i) be the action profile at the unique Nash
equilibrium of the game Γ. Let {xi,k}k≥0, {yli,k}k≥0, i, l ∈ V
be the sequences generated by (2a) and (2b), respectively, with
a step-size sequence {αk}k≥0 satisfying
∑∞
k=0 αk = ∞ and∑∞
k=0 α
2
k < ∞, and a positive constant δl, l ∈ V satisfying
0 ≤ δl[A]li < 2[A]ll for all i ∈ V , where A is the adjacency
matrix. Then, the sequence {xk}k≥0 converges to x? almost
surely when the smoothing parameter µi,∀i ∈ V tends to 0.
Proof: Noting that there might be multiple Nash equilibria in
game Γµ, we let x?µ = (x
?
i,µi ,x
?
−i,µ−i) be an action profile at
one of them. Applying [13, Lemma 1] yields
x?i,µi = PΩi [x?i,µi − αk∇xifi,µi(x?µ)], i ∈ V.
Thus, subtracting (2a) by the above equation, and taking the
norm
‖xi,k+1 − x?i,µi‖2
≤‖(xi,k − x?i,µi)− αk(giµi(yik)−∇xifi,µi(x?µ))‖2
=‖xi,k − x?i,µi‖2 + α2k‖giµi(yik)−∇xifi,µi(x?µ)‖2
− 2αk〈xi,k − x?i,µi , giµi(yik)−∇xifi,µi(x?µ)〉,
where we have applied the projection’s non-expansive prop-
erty. Taking the conditional expectation on Fk, we obtain
E[‖xi,k+1 − x?i,µi‖2|Fk]
≤‖xi,k − x?i,µi‖2 + α2kE[‖giµi(yik)−∇xifi,µi(x?µ)‖2|Fk]
− 2αk〈xi,k − x?i,µi ,∇xifi,µi(yik)−∇xifi,µi(x?µ)〉
=‖xi,k − x?i,µi‖2 + α2kE[‖giµi(yik)−∇xifi,µi(x?µ)‖2|Fk]
− 2αk〈xi,k − x?i,µi ,∇xifi,µi(yik)−∇xifi,µi(xk)〉
− 2αk〈xi,k − x?i,µi ,∇xifi,µi(xk)−∇xifi,µi(x?µ)〉. (6)
It is noted that
E[‖giµi(yik)−∇xifi,µi(x?µ)‖2|Fk]
≤ 2E[‖gµi(yik)‖2|Fk] + 2‖∇xifi,µi(x?µ)‖2 ≤ 4B2
and
− 2αk〈xi,k − x?i,µi ,∇xifi,µi(yik)−∇xifi,µi(xk)〉
= −2αk〈xi,k − x?i,µi ,∇xifi,µi(yik)−∇xifi,µi(yik,x−i,k)〉
− 2αk〈xi,k − x?i,µi ,∇xifi,µi(yik,x−i,k)−∇xifi,µi(xk)〉
≤ 2L1αk‖xi,k − x?i,µi‖‖yik − xi,k‖
+ 2L2αk‖xi,k − x?i,µi‖‖yi−i,k − x−i,k‖
≤ L1(1 + ‖xi,k − x?i,µi‖2)αk‖yik − xik‖
+ L2(1 + ‖xi,k − x?i,µi‖2)αk‖yi−i,k − x−i,k‖
≤ Lˆ(1 + ‖xi,k − x?i,µi‖2)
(
NCσˆαkγ
k
+NCB
k−1∑
r=1
γk−rαkαr−1 + Bαkαk−1
)
,
where Lˆ = L1+
√
N − 1L2, we have applied 2‖a‖ ≤ 1+‖a2‖
in the second inequality and (5) in the third inequality. Thus,
combining the above results to (6) and summing over i ∈ V
E[‖xk+1 − x?µ‖2|Fk] ≤ (1 + ηk)‖xk − x?µ‖2 + wk
− 2αk〈xk − x?µ, Fµ(xk)− Fµ(x?µ)〉, (7)
where
ηk = Lˆ
(
NCσˆαkγ
k
+NCB
k−1∑
r=1
γk−rαkαr−1 + Bαkαk−1
)
wk = 4NB2α2k + Lˆ
(
N2Cσˆαkγ
k
+N2CB
k−1∑
r=1
γk−rαkαr−1 +NBαkαk−1
)
.
Taking the limit µi →∞ for ∀i ∈ V , it follows from Lemma 2
that limµi→∞,∀i∈V x?µ = x
?. Thus, it can be obtained from (7)
that
E[‖xk+1 − x?‖2|Fk] ≤ (1 + ηk)‖xk − x?‖2 + wk
− 2αk〈xk − x?, F0(xk)− F0(x?)〉. (8)
Following the results in [27, Lemma 3] and the step-size∑∞
k=0 αk =∞,
∑∞
k=0 α
2
k <∞, we have
∞∑
k=0
ηk <∞,
∞∑
k=0
wk <∞.
Applying Lemma 11 in [37, Ch. 2] to (8), we can obtain
that ‖xk − x?‖ converges almost surely, and
∑∞
k=0 αk〈xk −
x?, F0(xk)−F0(x?)〉 <∞. From Assumption 3 and the fact
that F0(x) ∈ F(x), we have 〈xk−x?, F0(xk)−F0(x?)〉 ≥ 0.
Together with the step-size
∑∞
k=0 αk = ∞,
∑∞
k=0 α
2
k < ∞,
we obtain
lim inf
k→∞
xk = x
?.
Since ‖xk−x?‖ converges almost surely, we obtain the desired
result. 
Remark 6: Theorem 2 shows that the players’ action profile
xk will converge to the unique Nash equilibrium x? of game
Γ by selecting the diminishing smoothing parameter sequence.
B. Constant Step-Size
In this part, we suppose the step-size αk = α, which is a
positive constant.
A similar result to Theorem 1 on the consensus property can
be established. Instead of achieving the exact convergence,
for any i ∈ V , each player l’s estimate of player i’s action
yli,k, l ∈ V approximately converges to player i’s real action
xi,k with an error proportional to the step-size. The following
theorem formally states the result.
Theorem 3: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let
{xi,k}k≥0, {yli,k}k≥0, i, l ∈ V be the sequences generated
by (2a) and (2b), respectively, with a constant step-size se-
quence αk = α, and a positive constant δl, l ∈ V satisfying
0 ≤ δl[A]li < 2[A]ll for all i ∈ V , where A is the adjacency
matrix. Then, we have
lim sup
k→∞
E[‖xi,k − yli,k‖] ≤
(
γNCB
1− γ + B
)
α.
Proof: Following same arguments as in Theorem 1, the result
holds by taking the limsup on both sides of (5). 
Next, we introduce a slightly stronger assumption compared
to Assumption 3 on the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
in game Γ.
Assumption 4: The game mapping F of game Γ is strongly
monotone on Ω with a constant χ > 0, i.e., for any x,y ∈ Ω,
f(x), f(y) ∈ F, we have 〈f(x)− f(y),x− y〉 ≥ χ‖x− y‖2.
Remark 7: Assumption 4 also ensures the uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium in game Γ.
Now, we are ready to characterize the approximate conver-
gence of all players’ actions to the Nash equilibrium of game
Γ, which is formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4: Suppose Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 hold. Let x? =
(x?i ,x
?
−i) be the action profile at the unique Nash equilibrium
of game Γ. Let {xi,k}k≥0, {yli,k}k≥0, i, l ∈ V be the sequences
generated by (2a) and (2b), respectively, with a constant step-
size sequence αk = α satisfying the following condition
0 < 2χα− Lˆ
(
γNCB
1− γ + B
)
α2 < 1, (9)
and a positive constant δl, l ∈ V satisfying 0 ≤ δl[A]li <
2[A]ll for all i ∈ V , where A is the adjacency matrix. Then,
with the smoothing parameter µi,∀i ∈ V tending to 0, the
sequence {xk}k≥0 satisfies
lim sup
k→∞
E[‖xk − x?‖2] ≤
[4NB2 + Lˆ(γN2CB1−γ +NB)]α
2χ− Lˆ(γNCB1−γ + B)α
.
Proof: From Assumption 4 and the fact that F0(x) ∈ F(x),
we have 〈xk−x?, F0(xk)−F0(x?)〉 ≥ χ‖xk−x?‖. Following
the same arguments as in Theorem 2, and applying the above
results to (8), we obtain
E[‖xk+1 − x?‖2|Fk] ≤ (1 + ηk − 2χα)‖xk − x?‖2 + wk,
where
ηk = Lˆ
(
NCσˆαγk +NCBα2
k−1∑
r=1
γk−r + Bα2
)
wk = 4NB2α2 + Lˆ
(
N2Cσˆαγk
+N2CBα2
k−1∑
r=1
γk−r +NBα2
)
.
Taking the total expectation and the limsup on both sides, we
complete the proof based on the step-size condition (9). 
Remark 8: In general, if the constant step-size α is set small,
then the step-size condition (9) can be satisfied. Theorem 4
shows that all players’ actions approximately converge to the
Nash equilibrium of game Γ with an error depending on
the step-size α, the number of players N , the cost function
parameters D1, D2 (Lˆ and B are functions of D1, D2) and the
communication topology γ. It should also be noted that if the
step-size α is small, then the error bound is close to 0.
(a) G1 (b) G2 (c) G3
Fig. 1. Three different network topologies.
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Fig. 2. The relative errors of all players’ actions produced by the proposed
gradient-free method (αk = 0.1/
√
k + 1) under three different communica-
tion networks.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we demonstrate the performance of the pro-
posed algorithm by a numerical example. Consider an energy
consumption game of N players for Heating Ventilation and
Air Conditioning (HVAC) system (see [38]), where the cost
function of each player i can be modeled by the following
quadratic function:
fi(x) = ai(xi − xri )2 +
(
b
N∑
j=1
xj + c
)
xi, xi ∈ Ωi,
where ai > 0, b > 0, c and xri are constants for i ∈ V . It
is easy to verify that Assumptions 2, 3 and 4 are satisfied.
Throughout the simulation, we let ai = 1 for i ∈ V , b = 0.1
and c = 10. In the following simulation, we investigate the
effectiveness of the proposed algorithm from the perspectives
of network topology and number of players, followed by a
comparison with the gradient-based counterpart.
A. Network Topology
In this part, we first consider N = 5 players under
three different communication graphs as shown in Fig. 1.
Obviously, all these digraphs are strongly connected, hence
Assumption 1 is satisfied. Constant xri for i ∈ {1, . . . , 5} is set
to 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, respectively. For the implementation of
the algorithm, the step-size αk is set to 0.1/
√
k + 1. Besides,
we let the smoothing parameter sequence to be diminishing,
e.g., µik = 10
−2/k + 1 and δi = 0.5 for i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}.
The initial values of all players’ actions x0 and the estimates
of all players’ actions yi0 from player i for i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}
are all set to 0. The relative errors of all players’ actions
(‖xk − x?‖/‖x?‖) produced by the proposed gradient-free
method with diminishing step-size for three different network
topologies are plotted in Fig. 2. As can be observed, con-
Fig. 3. Network topology for N players.
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Fig. 4. The relative errors of all players’ actions produced by the proposed
gradient-free method (αk = 0.1/
√
k + 1) with different number of players.
vergence can be achieved under all three network topologies.
Specifically, the performance is better for the graph with more
edges due to the increased number of communication channels.
B. Number of Players
In this part, we increase the number of players to N =
10, 20, 30 and 40 under a strongly connected communication
graph as shown in Fig. 3. We set xri = 2i for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
The rest of parameters are set the same as in section V-A.
It is shown in Fig. 4 that the relative errors of all players’
actions (‖xk−x?‖/‖x?‖) produced by the proposed gradient-
free method with diminishing step-size for N = 10, 20, 30
and 40. As can be seen, the algorithm is scalable to different
number of players, and the convergence result is better for
smaller number of players, which is as expected.
C. Gradient-Free vs. Gradient-Based Algorithm
In this part, we compare the performance of the proposed
gradient-free algorithm with its gradient-based counterpart.
Specifically, the gradient-based algorithm adopts the same
updating laws as in (2a) and (2b), but the gradient-free oracle
is replaced with the true gradient information. We consider the
same problem settings as in section V-A under the communi-
cation graph as shown in Fig. 1-(a). For the implementation
of the algorithm, the step-size αk is set to 0.1/
√
k + 1 and
0.1, respectively. Figs. 5 and 6 present the players’ actions
generated by the proposed gradient-free algorithm with both
diminishing step-size and constant step-size, respectively. For
the gradient-based counterpart, the convergence results of
the players’ actions with both diminishing step-size αk =
0.1/
√
k + 1 and constant step-size αk = 0.1 are plotted in
Figs. 7 and 8, respectively.
Comparing Figs. 5 and 7 for diminishing step-size, and
Figs. 6 and 8 for constant step-size, it can be observed that the
convergence speed of the gradient-based algorithm is generally
faster than its gradient-free counterpart for both diminishing
and constant step-size scenarios. This result is reasonable
because the gradient-based algorithm has direct access to the
true gradient, where the structure information is included.
Fig. 5. The plot of all players’ actions produced by the proposed gradient-free
method with diminishing step-size αk = 0.1/
√
k + 1.
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Fig. 6. The plot of all players’ actions produced by the proposed gradient-free
method with constant step-size αk = 0.1.
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Fig. 7. The plot of all players’ actions produced by the gradient-based method
with diminishing step-size αk = 0.1/
√
k + 1.
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Fig. 8. The plot of all players’ actions produced by the gradient-based method
with constant step-size αk = 0.1.
On the other hand, the faster speed implies more aggressive
updates in the process, leading to a relatively larger overshoot,
which can be moderated by a smaller step-size.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a gradient-free distributed Nash equi-
librium seeking algorithm for non-cooperative games among
a group of players under a directed and strongly connected
communication graph. The proposed algorithm does not re-
quire the knowledge on the explicit analytical expression of
the cost function and allows the problem to be non-smooth.
The convergence of the proposed algorithm to the Nash
equilibrium has been rigorously studied for both diminishing
and constant step-sizes, respectively. Specifically, by choos-
ing a diminishing smoothing parameter, we have shown the
convergence to the exact Nash equilibrium for diminishing
step-size, and the neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium for
constant step-size, in which the gap is proportional to the
step-size. Finally, we have illustrated the performance of the
algorithm through a numerical example in the application of
HVAC system. An outlook to the future research can be the
consideration of the dynamical systems in the gradient-free
settings. Specifically, instead of having static unknown cost
functions, players may follow some dynamics, where the exact
model of these dynamics are unknown to the players.
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